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2Outline
• The regulatory process
• What does the law say – objects and
principles?
• Can there ever be a ‘correct’ regulatory
decision?
• Regulatory error and its consequences
3Outline (continued)
• Regulatory accountability and review of error
  judicial review
  merits review
  further appeals
• The benefits and costs of merits review
• Establishing precedent through merits review
• How do regulators respond to merits review?
4Outline (continued)
• What is the best merits review
mechanism?
 principles
 procedures
 review material
 composition
• Setting up a merits review mechanism
• Conclusions
5The regulatory process
•Market failure and government failure
•Objectives, benchmarks, principles and
assumptions: the law and in practice
•Prescription versus discretionary powers
•No unique correct answers – a balancing act
 consumers and producers
 short run and long run
 constraints and incentives
6What does the law say –
objects and principles?
• The need for a clear over-arching objects clause
• Other objectives should be compatible with  this
– beware conflicting goals like NPB v. NAB
• Prescription versus discretionary powers
• What is the benchmark performance?
• Acceptable principles, models, assumptions, roles
- eg propose/respond or submit/determine
regimes
7Can there ever be a ‘correct’
regulatory decision?
• In the absolute, no
• Debate over facts, models, assumptions,
relevant time period, limited data
availability, legislative goals, triggers,
amount of regulatory discretion, etc
• Correct for which party/stakeholder?
• What should the role of the regulator be – to
initiate or to  assess?
• The need for public hearings and open
debate – the regulator as a facilitator and
mediator of experts
8Regulatory error and its
consequences
• A state of no regulatory errors is unlikely
• What should be the regulator’s null
hypothesis? Type 1 and Type 2 errors
 which is worst?
 short run and long run consequences
 static, allocative and dynamic efficiencies
• Costs of regulatory error are sunk
• Is the regulator the ‘expert’ and thus to be
overturned only rarely?
9Regulatory
accountability and
review of error
• Natural justice demands accountability
and transparency
• No regulator (or even an appeal body) has
a monopoly on wisdom
• The right to appeal is the sine qua non of
fair regulation
 judicial review
 merits review
• Even regulators agree – at least in
Australia!
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Judicial review
• Can be used to correct errors of law or
wrongful use of power by a regulator – the
search for ‘institutional integrity’
• Cannot make substitute decisions – can
either affirm, or quash and remit
• Sought when the law is highly prescriptive
• Should not be used for an appeal on the facts
• A complement to merits review, not a
substitute – they are mutually exclusive
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Merits review
• A review by an independent expert body of
the use by a regulator of its discretionary
powers
• Such discretion is inevitable – it is not
possible for legislation to foresee all
possibilities
• Was the decision in error, or was the use of
discretion incorrect or unreasonable, or was
it not a situation where the exercise of
discretion was called for?
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Merits review
•Provides precedent leading to greater
transparency, accountability, efficiency,
learning, consistency and predictability in
regulation, providing better signals for
regulated companies
•A variety of outcomes are possible - merits
reviews can affirm, reverse, remit or substitute
a decision by ‘standing in the shoes’ of the
regulator
•Such outcomes are not available under judicial
review
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Merits review
•What information can be considered by the
appeal body – it is not a de novo hearing
•Merits review is available to any interested party
•Does merits review encourage regulatory gaming
or forum shopping?
• Is the regulator an expert body to be deferred to?
•What, in any, constraints should be imposed on
merits reviews?
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Merits review
• Can merits review hold things up? Not if
the decision is not stayed
• Merits reviews have not been frequently
sought in Australia to date
• However, a lot of reviewable error has
been found, especially under the Gas
Pipelines Access laws
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Further appeals
• On what grounds should a merits review
decision be appealable?
• What is an appropriate appeal body?
• Should new material ever be admitted?
• The need for binding precedent
• Appeals must be expedited
• Regular reviews of the law and its operation
are essential
• If the law is a problem it should be changed
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The benefits and costs of
merits review
• What is the nature of the error?
• Can it be easily identified and rectified?
• Private benefits and costs
 higher rate of return
 more investment possible
 better access to capital markets
 less uncertainty
 expense
 closer future scrutiny by regulator
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The benefits and costs of
merits review
•Social benefits and costs
  precedent and clarification
  greater investment may follow
  legitimise the regulator’s decision
  an independent assessment
  costs of regulatory gaming and forum    
shopping
  maverick regulatory decisions
  conservative regulatory decisions
  expenses imposed on the regulator
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Establishing precedent
through merits review
• Regulators’ decisions are situation-specific
• Certainty as to correct practice and
interpretation by the regulator only comes
from independent endorsement, unless
the law is highly prescriptive
• Regulatory best practice is not static -
new paradigms, models, theories etc need
to be considered on appeal
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How do regulators (and others)
respond to merits review?
•Regulators should not fear review, nor
feel reluctant to take a stand
•Does the existence of merits appeals
cause regulators to become more
conservative, or more radical?
 how to handle paradigm changes
 security of tenure
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•Regulators in Australia welcome the
existence of merits review
 Ed Willett, Commissioner, ACCC
 John Tamblyn, Chair, ESC of Victoria
•The Productivity Commission in its review of
the Gas Access Regime strongly supported a
merits review process, as did many
submissions to the review
How do regulators (and others)
respond to merits review?
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What is the best merits
review mechanism?
• Principle types of error to be considered
 error
 unreasonable use of discretion
 discretion used when not called for
• Procedures to be followed
• Material that can be considered
 only what was before the regulator plus transcripts
• Composition of the appeal body
 need for precedent – judicial member
 expert lay members
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Setting up a merits review
mechanism
• Different models in different jurisdictions
– there is no one-size-fits-all model
• A series of specialist panels or one body –
consistency issues
• Experts are essential
• Judicial presence is necessary
• Secretariat services
• Should the judge have the final say?
• What material can be presented?
• Do the parties’ experts get another go?
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Conclusions
• The law should have carefully
articulated objectives and principle to
be followed
• An open and transparent regulatory
process is essential
• Even then, regulatory error can occur –
regulators are not infallible
• Natural justice demands accountability
via judicial or merits review – but they
are complements not substitutes
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Conclusions (continued)
• Many alternative models are available for
merits review
• Merits review keeps regulators on their
toes, promotes regulatory and commercial
learning, and provides precedent and
greater certainty
• Very few countries do not have some form
of merits review for regulators’ decisions
– surely NZ regulators are not so perfect
that review is unnecessary?
